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Over 95% of post‐mortem samples from the 1918 pandemic, which caused 50
to 100 million deaths, showed bacterial infection complications. The introduc-
tion of antibiotics in the 1940s has since reduced the risk of bacterial infections,
but growing resistance to antibiotics could increase the toll from future
influenza pandemics if secondary bacterial infections are as serious as in
1918, or even if they are less severe. We develop a valuation model of the
option to withhold wide use of an antibiotic until significant outbreaks such
as pandemic influenza or foodborne diseases are identified. Using real options
theory, we derive conditions under which withholding wide use is beneficial,
and calculate the option value for influenza pandemic scenarios that lead to
secondary infections with a resistant Staphylococcus aureus strain. We find that
the value of withholding an effective novel oral antibiotic can be positive and
significant unless the pandemic is mild and causes few secondary infections
with the resistant strain or if most patients can be treated intravenously.
Although the option value is sensitive to parameter uncertainty, our results
suggest that further analysis on a case‐by‐case basis could guide investment
in novel agents as well as strategies on how to use them.
KEYWORDS
antibiotics, antibiotics resistance, insurance value, pandemic influenza, real options analysis,
secondary bacterial infections1 | INTRODUCTION
In the past 400 years, roughly three influenza pandemics have spread across the world each century, killing millions of
people (Potter, 2001). The most recent pandemic influenza prior to the introduction of antibiotics in 1942 was the 1918
(H1N1) pandemic, also known as the “Spanish Flu.” It was the most devastating pandemic historically, infecting a third
of the world's population and killing 50 to 100 million people (Johnson & Mueller, 2002). Postmortem samples showed
that over 95% of deaths in the 1918 pandemic were complicated by a bacterial infection (Morens, Taubenberger, &
Fauci, 2008), and had antibiotics been available in 1918, many deaths could have been averted (Brundage, 2006; Chien,
Levin, & Klugman, 2012; Handel, Longini, & Antia, 2009). Since then, experience and science have taught us moreHealth Economics. 2019;28:556–571.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/hec
MEGIDDO ET AL. 557about influenza viruses and pandemics (1957, 1968, and 2009), and we have developed tools, such as better infection
control, vaccines, antivirals, and antibiotics, to prepare for and combat future pandemics.
Despite the significant research on previous pandemics undertaken in the 21st century, it is difficult to predict the
timing and scale of the next pandemic. Influenza A viruses continually evolve through accumulated mutations over
time (antigenic drift) and also by less frequent, but more drastic, antigenic changes that occur when different subtypes
infect a single cell (antigenic shift). Pandemic influenza occurs when a novel influenza A subtype emerges or an old one
—not recently in cycle—remerges in an immunologically naïve human population (Webby & Webster, 2001). These
changes are unpredictable, making future pandemics inevitable, and their timing and scale unknown (Taubenberger
& Morens, 2010; Webby & Webster, 2001).
The World Health Organization (WHO) and several countries have developed pandemic preparedness plans,
which include maintaining stocks of antivirals, antibiotics, and vaccines to minimize the impact of future pandemics
(e.g., Department of Health, 2011a; US Department of Health and Human Services, 2005; WHO, 2009). Supporting these
plans, the breadth of literature on the value and cost‐effectiveness of stockpiling vaccines and antivirals has increased in
the 21st century (Velasco et al., 2012 and herin; Germann, Kadau, Longini, & Macken, 2006; Attema, Lugnér, &
Feenstra, 2010; Halder, Kelso, & Milne, 2014). However, the economic value of stockpiling or conserving the effective-
ness of antibiotics remains unexplored despite the high morbidity and mortality caused by secondary bacterial
infections.
Maintaining a stockpile of antibiotics will not be an effective strategy for prepardness if the antibiotics are not
effective. The emergence of multidrug resistant and pandrug‐resistant (PDR), untreatable infections and the alarm bells
of a potential postantibiotic era emphasize the value of protecting our investment in effective antibiotics, whether
existing or in the development pipeline (Chen, 2017; Laxminarayan et al., 2013; McGann et al., 2016; Souli, Galani,
& Giamarellou, 2008). In a world with prevalent PDR bacterial infections, treatment costs increase significantly, cuts
and scrapes can be life‐threatening, and common surgical procedures and cancer chemotherapy may lead to unaccept-
ably high rates of untreatable infections (ECDC & EMEA, 2009; Teillant, Gandra, Barter, Morgan, & Laxminarayan,
2015). In the event of a significant influenza pandemic, secondary infections caused by prevalent PDR bacteria could
be catastrophic. Ensuring effective antibiotics in the future is a public health priority, and only two novel classes of anti-
biotics have been introduced since the 1970s (Coates, Halls, & Hu, 2011).
A possible strategy for managing a newly developed antibiotic is to withhold its wide use to conserve its effectiveness
until a later time, when it potentially provides higher benefits. The benefits, or value, we garner in the future by this
delay are the opportunity cost of foregoing the antibiotic's use for a time. This value is pertinent to antibiotics because
increasing their use today may improve the effectiveness of the existing portfolio of drugs available to treat infections,
but with the irreversible cost of reduced effectiveness for treating an uncertain number of future infections. Antibiotic
effectiveness decreases because their use leads to selection pressure for resistant microbial strains, giving these strains
competitive advantage (Davies & Davies, 2010), and even if resistance is reversible by reducing consumption, the pro-
cess would be slow, costly, and easily reversed (Andersson & Hughes, 2010).
The literature on valuing new antibiotics provides a framework to estimate their expected net present value (NPV;
Sertkaya et al., 2014), but it fails to capture the irreversible effect of resistance and the value new antibiotics contribute
to having effective treatment options in the future. Traditional NPV analysis assumes the decision to invest is a now‐
or‐never one and does not consider delaying investing, or in our case, introducing the wide use of an antibiotic. However,
real options theory has studied the impact of irreversibility and uncertainty on the value of delaying investment and
maintaining flexibility (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McDonald & Siegel, 1986; Myers, 1977; Trigeorgis, 1996). Real options
valuation has roots in corporate finance, but its application has extended to other fields, including a growing literature
on real options analysis in healthcare investment and health technology assessment (e.g., Attema et al., 2010; Driffield
& Smith, 2007; Eckermann & Willan, 2008; Meyer & Rees, 2012; Palmer & Smith, 2000; Thijssen & Bregantini, 2017;
Wernz, Gehrke, & Ball, 2015). The real options framework has also been implemented and studied in the context of pest
resistance (Mbah, Forster, Wesseler, & Gilligan, 2010; Wesseler, 2003) and assessing policy changes (Beckmann,
Soregaroli, & Wesseler, 2006; Leitzel & Weisman, 1999; Wesseler & Zilberman, 2014).
Studies on delaying access to treatment highlight additional values that underpin a real options framework for
considering either immediately offering or delaying access to antibiotics (Littmann, Buyx, & Cars, 2015). Eckermann
and Willan (2008) show that the option to delay introduction to collect additional evidence may be preferable to
adopting health technologies when the decision is irreversible. Wesseler and Zilberman (2014) develop an option model
to demonstrate how political economy can drive delaying introducing a Vitamin A deficiency‐reducing technology.
Other authors have raised ethical issues related to delaying access to treatment, including intragenerational and
558 MEGIDDO ET AL.intergenerational justice (Dawson & Verweij, 2007), and the trade‐off between patient autonomy and drug control
(Coleman, Jaramillo, Reis, & Selgelid, 2010). The common theme is that these studies assess trade‐offs between imme-
diate and delayed treatment.
In this paper, we apply real options theory and develop a framework for assessing trade‐offs to estimate the value of
investing in developing and conserving an antibiotic to mitigate the burden of bacterial infections during pandemic
influenza. The model can be applied to value the availability of effective antibiotics in other potential scenarios, such
as regional outbreaks of PDR bacteria in healthcare settings that force shutting down intensive care units, outbreaks
of foodborne resistant infections in the community, or simply when resistant bacteria are more prevalent in the
community. We focus on pandemic influenza because several countries already maintain a stockpile in preparation,
but these stockpiles will not be effective if the antibiotics are not effective. Furthermore, the high burden over a short
period can stress the health system and other sectors of the economy. In the following section, we derive the theoretical
solution and study threshold rules for when investing in an antibiotic and withholding its use until an outbreak is
beneficial. We numerically estimate the value for scenarios of pandemic influenza in the United Kingdom (UK).2 | MODEL: OPTION VALUE OF CONSERVING ANTIBIOTICS
We assume the novel antibiotic is available at time t0 = 0, and its development cost is I. At time t1, which is uncertain,
an outbreak of infections caused by PDR bacteria is identified. A decision maker, such as the UK Department of Health,
needs to decide whether to widely introduce the antibiotic at t0 or withhold its wide use until t1, when the benefits may
be higher. We model both policies' NPVs, with costs and benefits related to the new antibiotic that accrue over time,
discounted at the annual rate, μ. The difference between the policies' NPVs represent the value of the option to conserve
the antibiotic's effectiveness until the outbreak is identified. We define this value as the “option value.” Because the
novel antibiotic is available at time t0 in both policies (i.e., investment in the antibiotic is not delayed in either policy),
the investment cost I does not impact the option value of conserving effectiveness.2.1 | Policy A: Withhold wide use of antibiotic
Use of the novel antibiotic is held off until a significant outbreak is detected at an uncertain point in time, t1 (Figure 1).
The model for Policy A calculates the value to invest in developing an antibiotic conserved until detecting the outbreak.
The annual costs of stockpiling and storing the antibiotic (CS) are incurred starting at t0 = 0. The outbreak is expected
to occur κO years after the antibiotic has been developed (i.e., at time t1 = κO). Wemodel the uncertainty related to the start
of the outbreak by letting κO follow the exponential distribution g κOð Þ ¼ hOe−hOκO , with E(κO) = 1/hO, where hO denotes
the hazard rate. The outbreak duration, κL, is exponentially distributed withk κLð Þ ¼ hLe−hLκL and E(κL) = 1/hL, where hLis
the hazard rate.
The stockpile maintenance and distribution costs during the outbreak are CR. The availability of the novel antibiotic
during the outbreak leads to benefits (BP) that include the avoided economic costs that would have been incurred in the
absence of the antibiotic.FIGURE 1 Policy A. The antibiotic is
available at t0, but is held off until the
outbreak is detected
MEGIDDO ET AL. 559When the antibiotic is introduced, bacterial resistance to the drug emerges and spreads. We model the decrease in
effectiveness of the novel antibiotic by discounting the treatment benefits at the annual rate of decay, r. Thus, the
effective annual benefits of the new antibiotic during the outbreak are BPe−r t−κOð Þ, for κO ≤ t < κO + κL.
After the outbreak (i.e., after t2 = κO + κL), the antibiotic provides annual benefits of BAPe−r t−κOð Þ. The postoutbreak
benefits represent the antibiotic, increasing the effectiveness of the portfolio of antibiotics available to treat infections.
At this point, we no longer withhold and stockpile the antibiotic.
Using the functional forms for the distribution of uncertain times, κO and κL, specified above, we obtain the present
value net benefits of Policy A as follows (Appendix SA presents the derivations):
Pre‐outbreak costs of stockpiling and storing are
CS
μþ hO; (1)
benefits—costs during the outbreak are
hO
μþ hO
BP
r þ μþ hL −
CR
μþ hL
 
; (2)
benefits after the outbreak are
hOhLBAP
μþ hOð Þ r þ μð Þ r þ μþ hLð Þ; (3)
and the NPV of Policy A is
–I– 1ð Þ þ 2ð Þ þ 3ð Þ: (4)
2.2 | Policy B: Immediately introduce antibiotic
The antibiotic is launched and is immediately part of the existing portfolio of antibiotics at t0 = 0 (Figure 2).
The annual costs of stockpiling and storing the novel antibiotic (CS) are incurred from t0 = 0 until the outbreak at t1.
The benefits from immediate release are a more diverse portfolio of antibiotics in the pre‐outbreak period, which
provides an annual benefit of BPPe
−rt, for 0 ≤ t < κO.
After the outbreak is identified at t1 = κO and until it is over at t2 = κO + κL, costs for stockpile maintenance and
distribution (CR) are accrued. The annual benefits of the novel antibiotic during the outbreak, BPe
−rt, for κO ≤ t < κO + κL,
account for the decreasing effectiveness due to resistance. The discounted annual benefits after the outbreak (i.e., after
t2 = κO + κL) are BAPe
−rt.
The present value net benefits in each period of Policy B (derivations in Appendix SA) are as follows:
benefits—costs before the outbreak are
BPP
μþ r þ hO −
CS
μþ hO; (5)FIGURE 2 Policy B. The antibiotic is
available at t0 and is widely introduced
immediately
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hOBP
r þ μþ hOð Þ r þ μþ hLð Þ −
hOCR
μþ hOð Þ μþ hLð Þ; (6)
benefits after the outbreak are
hOhLBAP
r þ μð Þ r þ μþ hOð Þ r þ μþ hLð Þ; (7)
and the NPV of Policy B is
–I þ 5ð Þ þ 6ð Þ þ 7ð Þ: (8)
2.3 | Option value
The option value of conserving effectiveness is the difference between expressions (4) and (8).2.4 | Parameters thresholds
We now investigate the conditions under which the option value is positive and withholding immediate wide use of the
antibiotic is beneficial. After simplifications, the condition NPVA > NPVB implies
BPP
BP þ hLr þ μ BAP
<
rhO
μþ hOð Þ r þ μþ hLð Þ: (9)
Note that the right‐hand side of inequality (9) is always non‐negative (as all parameters are non‐negative) and less
than unity.
To consider the ratio of potential pre‐outbreak benefits to ones during the outbreak, we further assume benefits after
the outbreak—and after the novel antibiotic has been introduced in both Policies A and B—are negligible (i.e., BAP ≈ 0).
Inequality (9) then reduces to
Bpp
Bp
<
rh0
μþ h0ð Þ r þ μþ hLð Þ: (10)
Letting
rhO
μþ hOð Þ r þ μþ hLð Þ ¼ m, we can interpret condition (10) as the maximum ratio of pre‐outbreak to outbreak
benefits,
Bpp
Bp
 
, for which withholding wide use of an antibiotic (Policy A) is more beneficial than using it immediately
(Policy B).
Because ∂m/∂r > 0, the maximum value of the threshold is when r →∞, producing m ¼ h0
μþ h0. Similarly, because
∂m/∂hO > 0, when hO→∞, thenm ¼ rr þ μþ hL. Finally, because ∂m/∂hL < 0, the maximum value ofm is when hL→ 0,
producing m ¼ rho
μþ h0ð Þ r þ μð Þ.
Note that in the extreme cases, when r = 0 or hO = 0, inequality (10) reduces to
BPP
BP
< 0, which cannot hold because
benefits are positive. Therefore, when r = 0 or hO = 0, NPVA < NPVB. Intuitively, if no resistance to antibiotics builds up
(r = 0), then we always choose to introduce the antibiotic immediately after its development. Similarly, if expected time
to the outbreak approaches infinity (hO = 0), we always choose immediate introduction.
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3.1 | Influenza pandemic scenario
We based our pandemic scenarios on the UK preparedness plan assumptions (Department of Health, 2007, 2011a) but
made specific assumptions regarding prevalence of bacterial infections (see Table 1). In the base‐case, we assumed that
the influenza pandemic will lead to secondary bacterial infections in 20% of cases (Brundage, 2006; Morens et al., 2008),
with 10% of these infections caused by a resistant Staphylococcus aureus strain (Louria, Blumenfeld, Ellis, Kilbourne, &
Rogers, 1959; Morens et al., 2008; Oswald, Shooter, & Curwen, 1958; Schwarzmann, Adler, Sullivan, & Marine, 1971).
Though S. aureus represented only 8% of bacterial pathogens in autopsies of the 1,918 pandemic, it was predominant in
the 1,957 pandemic potentially because resistance to tetracycline and streptomycin was becoming widespread
(Department of Health, 2011b; Morens et al., 2008). We assumed the base‐case scenario hazard rate (hO) is 1/150
(see Appendix SB).
The prevalence of secondary bacterial infections in community and healthcare settings would stress the healthcare
system. Available oral antibiotics may not effectively treat infections with the resistant S. aureus strain, and individuals
infected with the strain would require hospitalization. Though we assumed intravenous (IV) therapy exists, the
increased volume of cases would overburden the health system, leading to deaths and increased economic costs.
Previous estimates suggested that hospital capacity may only meet 20% to 25% of expected demand at the pandemic
peak (Department of Health, 2007), and exacerbating the situation, the risk of secondary bacterial infections may be
greater in healthcare settings than in the community, particularly in the case of a pathogen such as resistant S. aureus,
which is prevalent in this setting (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2017; Nin et al., 2011). We
modelled three levels of IV therapy coverage: 20%, 50%, and 80%.
Table 1 provides details on the base‐case scenario and on more mild and severe scenarios; Appendix SB describes the
scenario parameter choices in more detail.
We assumed the novel oral antibiotic can effectively treat the resistant infections and alleviate the burden on the
health system. However, S. aureus has been quick to develop resistance to novel antibiotics historically (Chambers &
DeLeo, 2009; Grundmann, Aires‐de‐Sousa, Boyce, & Tiemersma, 2006). In the base‐case, we assumed that when in
use, the antibiotic effectiveness treating infections caused by the resistant S. aureus strain decayed at the annual rate
(r) 0.02 (Table 2). This means that 10 years after the antibiotic's introduction and wide use, it would no longer treat
18% of infections effectively (see Appendix SB for comparison with the speed S. aureus developed resistance
historically).3.2 | Costs
We considered the costs of developing (I) and stockpiling (CS) the novel antibiotic, including the cost of wastage,
misdiagnosis, and empirical treatment that is likely due to the volume of patients. We ignored the costs of distributing
antibiotics (CR) during the pandemic, which are small compared with potential burden averted by the novel antibiotic
(see Section 3.3) and are incurred in both Policies A and B. Future costs were discounted at 3.5%. Table 2 provides the
costs and benefits (further explained in Appendix SB).3.3 | Benefits
We estimated the benefits before (BPP), during (BP), and after the pandemic (BAP) based on the avertable burden by the
novel antibiotic, including hospitalization, deaths, and economic losses. Prior to pandemic influenza, the healthcare
system would not be overburdened and individuals could be treated intravenously in healthcare facilities. However,
the novel oral antibiotic would reduce the length of stay in hospitals and prevent hospitalization, averting hospital days
and associated costs in Policy B (Table 2).
The avertable burden during the pandemic depends on the number of secondary infections caused by the resistant
S. aureus strain (Table 1). We assumed that the novel oral antibiotic would not be more effective treating infections
caused by the resistant strain than IV‐administered antibiotics, and therefore the oral antibiotic would not avert
additional deaths among patients that could alternatively be treated by IV therapy. However, the availability of oral
TABLE 1 Pandemic influenza scenarios
Base‐case
Mild
scenario
Severe
scenario
Sensitivity
distributiona
Source for
assumptions
Pandemic influenza
Pandemic hazard rate (hO) 1/150 3/100 1/500 Lognormal (1/500,
1/100, 1/20)
Potter, 2001
Pandemic attack rateb 35% 25% 50% Beta (15%, 30%, 50%) Department of Health,
2007, 2011a; Ferguson
et al., 2006; Potter, 2001
Pandemic duration (1/hO) 15 weeks 15 weeks 15 weeks Lognormal (5, 15,
52 weeks)
Department of Health,
2007, 2011a; Potter,
2001; Taubenberger &
Morens, 2010
Pandemic overall case
fatality rate (CFR), including
secondary bacterial infections
1% 0.04% 2.5% Beta (0.02%, 0.5%, 2%)c Department of Health,
2007, 2011a; US
Department of Health
and Human Services,
2005
Secondary bacterial infections
Percent develop secondary
bacterial infectionsb
20% 10% 30% Beta (10%, 20%, 35%) Brundage, 2006;
Department of Health,
2007, 2011a; Morens,
Taubenberger, & Fauci,
2008
Percent of bacterial infections
caused by Staphylococcus
aureus, resistant to existing
oral antibioticsb
10% 1.25% 20% Beta (0%, 2%, 20%) Department of Health,
2011b; Louria,
Blumenfeld, Ellis,
Killbourne, & Rogers,
1959; Morens et al.,
2008; Oswald, Shooter,
& Curwen, 1958;
Schwarzmann, Adler,
Sullivan, & Marine,
1971
CFR for S. aureus secondary
bacterial infections
30% 20% 30% Beta (15%, 25%, 35%) (Department of Health,
2011a; Oswald et al.,
1958)
Proportion of secondary
infections that can be treated
intravenouslyb,d
20%, 50%,
and 80%
50% and
80%
20% and
50%
Lognormal (10, 40, 500
thousand)
Authors' assumption
aDistribution used in the Latin‐Hypercube Sampling Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient sensitivity analysis. Percentiles the distribution was fitted to are pro-
vided in parentheses: 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5%.
bUsed to estimate avertable cases and deaths by the novel antibiotic.
cOverall case fatality rate (CFR) only affects models that consider economic losses due to absenteeism from work, which is a function of the number of deaths.
Additionally, the sensitivity range for overall CFR does not include deaths due to the infections caused by the resistant S. aureus strain.
dWe assume that antibiotics can be administered intravenously, but this is not a viable route because of health system constrains during epidemics. The
sensitivity range is in terms of total capacity to intravenously treat the secondary infections with the resistant S. aureus strain instead of percent covered; the
percent covered is then calculated depending on the size of the pandemic.
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treat with IV administered antibiotics, the oral antibiotic would avert both hospitalizations and deaths. We conserva-
tively assumed the oral antibiotic does not avert losses to the economy in the base‐case scenario, but we do consider
potential impact on economic losses in the sensitivity analysis.
The benefits decayed according to r when policy dictated the oral antibiotic's wide use. Benefits were further
discounted at 3.5%.
TABLE 2 Costs and benefits
Base‐case Sensitivity rangea Source for assumptions
Antibiotic
Out‐of‐pocket cost of
developing an antibiotic (I)
$1.1 billion DiMasi, Grabowski, and Hansen,
2016; Sertkaya et al., 2014
Stockpile size 1 million Lognormal (0.2, 1, 5 million) Lugnér & Postma, 2009;
Siddiqui & Edmunds, 2008Stockpile storage cost per
course per year
$1 Truncated normal ($0.20, $1.00,
$1.90)
Population level effectiveness
rate of decay when in use (r)
0.02 Lognormal (0.004, 0.015, 0.050) Grundmann, Aires‐de‐Sousa,
Boyce, & Tiemersma, 2006
and herin; Chambers & DeLeo,
2009
Disease Burden costsb
Value of statistical life $2.4 million Truncated normal ($1.8, $2.4, $3.0
million)
Department for Transport, 2017
Cost of hospitalization
per patient
$5,000 Truncated normal ($2, $5, $8
thousand)
Lode, 2007; NICE, 2014;
Rozenbaum, Mangen, Huijts,
van der Werf, & Postma, 2015
Economic benefits
ac 0, 27 Fit based on Keogh‐Brown,
Smith, Edmunds, & Beutels,
2010; Smith, Keogh‐Brown,
Barnett, & Tait, 2009
uc 0, 0.30 Fit based on Keogh‐Brown et al.,
2010; Smith et al., 2009
Averted burden when there is no pandemic (annual)
Hospital days 300,000 Truncated normal (200, 300, 400
thousand)
Authors' assumption
Other
Discount rate 3.5%
Costs are in US$, 2015.
aDistribution used in Latin‐Hypercube Sampling Partial Rank Correlation Coefficient sensitivity analysis. Percentiles the distribution was fitted to are provided
in parentheses: 2.5%, 50%, and 97.5%.
bDisease burden costs are represented as benefits—from averted burden by the novel antibiotic—in the model.
cShape parameter in function of percent Gross Domestic Product loss in terms of mortality (see the Appendix). We evaluate each scenario without economic
losses averted (i.e., a and u are both 0) and with economic losses averted.
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Alternative scenarios were constructed to explore influenza pandemics of differing magnitude (Table 1). We set the
hazard rate for the mild scenario at three of 100 per year, and for the severe scenario at one of 300 per year. We did
not consider low capacity to treat (20% of patients) with IV‐administered antibiotics in the mild pandemic scenario,
and we did not consider high capacity to treat (80% of patients) in the severe scenario; scenarios which seemed
unreasonable.
We also estimated the option value accounting for economic losses averted in addition to hospitalizations and deaths
averted. On the basis of a general equilibrium model of influenza pandemic in the United Kingdome, we assumed an
S‐shaped curve representing percent Gross Domestic Product (GDP) loss in terms of the mortality rate—a high number
of deaths during the pandemic triggers absenteeism from work, which drives economy losses (Smith et al., 2009; see
Appendix SB and SC for details).
Lastly, we explored the relative sensitivity of the option value model to parameters using Latin hypercube sampling
and conducting a partial rank correlation coefficient (PRCC) analysis. The sampling distributions are provided in
Table 1 and in Table 2. Parameters with large absolute PRCC values that are statistically significant (t test) are most
influential (See Appendix SB for more detail). We further explored the most important parameters and examined
how they impact the option value threshold for the influenza pandemic application.
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In the base‐case pandemic scenario approximately 455,000 individuals developed secondary bacterial infections with the
S. aureus strain, resistant to all oral options but the novel antibiotic. The strain caused approximately 68,000 deaths
when we assumed the healthcare system had the capacity to intravenously treat 50% of patients infected with it (30%
of all pandemic related deaths). The strain caused 27,000 deaths if capacity was set to 80% and 109,500 deaths if it
was 20%.
Figure 3 shows the option value for different scenarios. When IV therapy capacity during the pandemic was set to
50% or 20%, withholding wide use proved to be fruitful, providing a value of $578 million and $2.2 billion, respectively.
However, introducing the novel antibiotic prior to identifying the pandemic would have been the better strategy if 80%
of patients infected with the strain could be treated intravenously. The value of waiting until the pandemic was identi-
fied was −$1.1 billion in this case.4.2 | Alternative scenarios
If the pandemic proved to be mild, withholding the novel antibiotic prior to the pandemic was not beneficial (Figure 3),
even though the hazard rate for this scenario was significantly higher. In the mild pandemic scenario 6,500 individuals
died, and the resistant S. aureus strain was responsible for either 800 (80% coverage) or 2,000 deaths (50% coverage),
depending on IV therapy coverage. The option value was approximately −$1.3 billion for both IV therapy coverage
levels.
Withholding wide use of the novel antibiotic until the severe pandemic scenario provided significant value despite
the low hazard rate. In this scenario, the pandemic CFR was set to 2.5% and deaths caused by infections with the
resistant S. aureus strain represented 36% (57.5%) of these deaths when IV therapy covered 50% (20%) of patients.
The option value was $2.1 billion ($4.7 billion) when IV therapy covered 50% (20%) of patients.FIGURE 3 Value of withholding a novel oral antibiotic until pandemic influenza is identified. The values without economic losses include
deaths and hospitalizations averted. Economic losses are based on an S‐shaped curve relating percent GDP loss to mortality, which triggers
higher rates of absenteeism. We consider different levels of capacity for the healthcare system treating patients intravenously: 20%, 50%, and
80% in the base‐case, 50% and 80% when the pandemic scenario is mild, and 20% and 50% when it is severe. Parameters for the base‐case,
mild, and severe scenarios are provided in Tables 1 and 2 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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The option value was higher if we considered economic losses. In the mild pandemic scenario, benefits due to economic
losses averted were insignificant, and withholding wide use until the pandemic remained unattractive. Withholding
wide use until the base‐case pandemic also remained unattractive if 80% of patients could be treated by IV therapy.
However, the value increased by 141% (57%) when IV coverage was 50% (20%). In the severe scenario, the value
increased by 73% (50%) when IV coverage was 50% (20%).4.4 | Model sensitivity to parameters
Table 3 shows the results from the PRCC sensitivity analysis. As expected, a higher pandemic hazard rate (PRCC = 0.581,
p < 0.0001), a larger pandemic (PRCC = 0.279, p < 0.0001), and a higher antibiotic decay rate (PRCC = 0.578,
p < 0.0001) increased the value of withholding wide use of the novel antibiotic. The most important parameter influenc-
ing potential benefits during the pandemic was the portion of secondary bacterial infections caused by the resistant
strain (PRCC = 0.790, p < 0.0001). The most influential parameter negatively correlated with the option value was
the cost of hospitalization (PRCC = −0.622, p < 0.0001). A longer pandemic duration (PRCC = −0.305, p < 0.0001)
reduced the value due to resistance spreading and due to discounting further into the future; we did not consider the
shock impact of a high number of deaths over a short duration, which likely would have increased the negative impact
of the pandemic duration hazard rate.4.5 | Option value thresholds
In this section, we vary the most influential parameters to determine under what conditions Policy A, the option to
withhold wide use of the novel antibiotic, is beneficial. We then also use Equation (10) to consider the maximum ratio
of benefits prepandemic to postpandemic for Policy A to be beneficial.
Figure 4 plots the impact of the pandemic—captured by varying the percent of secondary bacterial infections that
are caused by the resistant S. aureus strain—against other influential parameters. In each panel, all other parameters
were set to the base‐case without economic losses averted and IV therapy coverage at 50%. When we set the hazard rate
(Panel A) to 3/100 per year, the cut‐off point at which withholding the antibiotic was beneficial (the value of waiting = 0)
was when the resistant strain caused approximately 2% of secondary infections and 14,000 avertable deaths. For hazard
rates, 1/100, 1/300, or 1/500 per year, the corresponding cut‐off points were approximately 4.5%, 11.7%, or 18.0% of
secondary infections.TABLE 3 Partial rank correlation coefficient (PRCC) sensitivity analysis
Parameter PRCC p value
Antibiotic stockpiling costs 0.000 0.94337
Hospitalization costs −0.622 0.00000
Value of statistical life 0.052 0.00000
Hospital days averted during non‐pandemic period −0.409 0.00000
Pandemic hazard rate 0.581 0.00000
Pandemic period hazard rate (1/mean duration) −0.305 0.00000
Pandemic attack rate 0.279 0.00000
Pandemic case fatality rate (not including deaths caused
by resistant Staphylococcus aureus strain)
0.071 0.0000
Percent develop secondary 0.260 0.00000
Portion of bacterial infections that are S. aureus strain
resistant to existing oral antibiotics
0.790 0.00000
Secondary infections with resistant S. aureus strain
case fatality rate
0.116 0.00000
Capacity to treat intravenously −0.199 0.00000
Antibiotic decay rate 0.578 0.00000
Note. 100,000 Latin Hypercube samples were drawn. Parameter distributions are presented in Tables 1 and 2.
566 MEGIDDO ET AL.When we set the novel antibiotic annual rate of decay (Panel B) to 0.02, the cut‐off point was approximately 6.3% of
secondary infections caused by the resistant strain (~43,000 avertable deaths). The lowest rate of decay for which
withholding the antibiotic was beneficial was 0.0067, and it was only beneficial when more than 19.7% of secondary
infections were caused by the resistant bacteria (~134,000 avertable deaths).
When we set the cost of hospitalization (Panel C) to below $2,000, the resistant strain had to cause more than 2.3% of
secondary infections for Policy A to be beneficial. When we set the cost to $5,000 or $10,000 the cut‐off point was 5% and
12.7% of secondary infections, respectively. If 100,000 hospital days were averted (Panel D) in the year the antibiotic was
first introduced during the pre‐pandemic period (and slightly less each following year as the antibiotic decayed), the cut‐
off point would be 2% of secondary infections, and if it was 300,000 or 500,000 hospital days averted, the cut‐off points
would be 6.3% (~43,000 avertable deaths) and 10.7% (~73,000 avertable deaths), respectively.
Finally, we use the base‐case values of parameters on the right‐hand side of inequality (10) to calculate the threshold
BPP
BP
<
0:02 ×
1
150
0:035þ 1
150
 
0:02þ 0:035þ 52
15
  ≈ 0:001:FIGURE 4 Sensitivity of the option value to influential parameters. The x‐axis is the percent of secondary infections caused by the resistant
Staphylococcus aureus strain; the approximate number of avertable deaths by an effective oral antibiotic are in parentheses. The y‐axes are (a)
the annual hazard rate of the base‐case pandemic influenza scenario, (b) the novel antibiotic annual rate of decay when the antibiotic is
widely used, (c) the cost of hospitalization, and (d) the number of hospital days averted annually when the antibiotic is widely used during
the nonpandemic period. In each panel, all other parameters are set to the base‐case without economic losses averted (see Tables 1 and 2)
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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benefits during the pandemic are at least 1,000 times greater than the annual prepandemic benefits. In the mild and
severe pandemic scenarios, the annual benefits during the pandemic would need to be at least 380 and 3,000 times
greater than the prepandemic ones, respectively.5 | DISCUSSION
The literature assessing the value and cost‐effectiveness of antibiotics assumes introducing antibiotics is a now‐or‐never
decision (e.g., Sertkaya et al., 2014) despite the inherent value of the option to delay antibiotics' use to slow down
emergence and spread of resistance. We developed a model based on real options theory to estimate the value of
delaying antibiotic introduction. The closest work to our model is by Attema et al. (2010), who use a real options
framework to value investment in stockpiling an antiviral drug for an influenza pandemic with uncertain timing. In
their model, the economic value derives from the option to delay investing in their stockpile, but we additionally value
delaying the spread of resistance to our treatment. The effectiveness of the precautionary measure (i.e., the stockpile) is
endogenous in our model. Attema et al. assume uncertainty follows a Brownian motion. Our goal was to provide a
closed‐form solution that can be simply calculated for different antibiotics and indications without requiring simula-
tion. Incorporating antimicrobial resistance in our model introduced additional complexity that prevented us from
arriving at a close‐form solution, and therefore, we assumed exponentially distributed uncertainty. We derived a
theoretical condition under which withholding wide use of the antibiotic would be a preferred option from a
benefit–cost perspective as compared with using the antibiotic immediately. We empirically quantified the threshold
value for the condition to withhold, and we estimated the option value for stockpiling and withholding wide use of
a novel oral antibiotic until detecting an influenza pandemic that potentially overwhelms the healthcare system in
the United Kingdom.
Pandemic influenza preparedness provides a clear example of when conserving antibiotic effectiveness for a specific
indication provides value to society. If the background prevalence of resistant bacterial strains—mostly carried
asymptomatically in the community—is high, pandemic influenza can lead to a wave of secondary infections with
few treatment options. Even if prevalence in the community is not high, transmission of resistant strains in healthcare
facilities that are accommodating an influx of patients can be high, similarly leading to resistant secondary infections.
The acute pressure on the healthcare system could overwhelm providers to the point they cannot sufficiently treat all
patients during the peak of the pandemic, even if IV antibiotic therapy exists. Without an effective option to quell rising
demand for an orally‐administered antibiotic in primary care services, a high number of cases and deaths and knock‐on
effects on the economy caused by absenteeism could be devastating. Interventions that mitigate these outcomes will
undoubtedly hold value. The health economics literature found pharmaceutical interventions, such as vaccines and
antivirals, and non‐pharmaceutical interventions, such as school‐closures, cost‐effective in many circumstances
(Velasco et al., 2012). Effective antibiotics are unlikely to reduce the number of cases in an influenza pandemic, but they
are likely to reduce severe illness and deaths, and therefore, potential absenteeism (Chien et al., 2012).
We found that protecting our hypothetical oral antibiotic until detecting pandemic influenza can provide significant
value. However, if the pandemic is mild, or if the prevalence of the resistant pathogen is nonexistent, the population
would be better off either using the antibiotic earlier or continuing to wait until a more significant event occurs. We
assumed a prevalent S. aureus strain resistant to all oral options except for the hypothetical drug. A few novel agents
for treating methicillin‐resistant S. aureus were approved in the last decade, including linezolid, which can be admin-
istered orally, and additional investigational agents are in the pipeline (Rodvold & McConeghy, 2014). Our hypothetical
antibiotic can represent one of these drugs, but because experience has taught us that S. aureus quickly develops
resistance to novel agents, our model may also be used as a decision tool, whether to invest in a new drug.
If we wait until no options are available before deciding to invest in novel drugs, we may be too late. Having effective
antibiotics is critical for preventing outbreaks in healthcare settings, forcing shutting down wards and for reducing the
impact and costs of disastrous events, such as significant influenza pandemics (Brundage, 2006), food‐borne infection
outbreaks (Newell et al., 2010), or natural disasters (Ligon, 2006). These events are unpredictable, and it is unlikely that
scientists and pharmaceuticals will have sufficient time to develop new effective drugs when they strike.
Ignoring the opportunity cost to delay the introduction of novel antibiotics and conserve their effectiveness will
narrow investments in antibiotics to ones that provide immediate value and will presuppose a strategy of immediate
wide use, leaving the population unprepared. When the risks for significant events that will require effective antibiotics
568 MEGIDDO ET AL.are sufficiently low, we may be better off not investing in a new drug when other options are available, but ignoring the
benefits of the option to delay increases the likelihood that we will not be prepared even if the risks are sufficiently high.
Decisions on investment in antibiotics need to consider both immediate values and the value to delay. Immediately
introducing an approved agent will be the optimal choice in many cases. For example, agents that treat infections with a
high burden and limited treatment options; agents that add significant value by increasing the diversity of an existing
portfolio and slowing resistance spread; and agents that provide significant value enabling other medical procedures,
including surgery and chemotherapy.
Our model is a simplification. We only consider one significant event (i.e., one pandemic influenza) occurring, we do
not consider transmission dynamics, and we assume that resistance to the novel antibiotic increases at a constant rate
when it is widely used. These assumptions can be relaxed in future models and simulations. Furthermore, a positive
value in our model does not imply private firms have incentive to invest in antibiotic development. Providing a rational
for this would require a broader regulatory and risk sharing framework, and this is an area for future work. We apply
our model to a pandemic influenza scenario leading to secondary bacterial infections; however, reparametrizing the
model, it can be applied to other outbreaks.
The results we present in our worked example suggest that considering the option value of delaying introducing
antibiotics is important for making decisions to invest in antibiotics. Governments globally will need to consider this
value as we move to new business models for encouraging antibiotics research and development (R&D) and promoting
stewardship; experts globally are pushing for a delinked model for antibiotics, in which healthcare systems pay a flat
annual fee instead of pharmaceutical revenues relying on volume of sales (Department of Health, 2017; Towse et al.,
2017). This provides the healthcare system the opportunity to devise strategies for antibiotics use. For certain antibiotics,
it may be obvious that introducing the antibiotic today will be optimal, but in other cases, comparing the values an
antibiotic provides can guide investment in novel agents as well as strategies on how to use them.CONFLICT OF INTEREST
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